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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT GF PRIVATIZATION ON THE 0R6ANIZATI0NAL CULTURE:
THE SUMERBANK'S CASE
By
Aylin Olcay Gocer
Supervisor: Assist,Prof. Oguz Baburoglu
While privatization has been well documented in terms 
of economic and financial analysis, little has been written 
from the human resources perspective and the issues of 
organizational culture and privatization's impact on the 
employees have not been studied.
This thesis aims to articulate the culture in 
Sumerbank; to examine the possible impact of privatization of 
the employees; to show the culture clash between the taken- 
for-granted economic and financial assumptions of 
privatization and the organizational culture of Sumerbank; 
and to suggest a new privatization strategy that is sensitive 
to the culture of Sumerbank.
Key words: Privatization, organizational culture,
Sumerbankian, integration and ambiguity paradigm.
ÖZET
ÖZELLEŞTİRMENİN KURUMSAL KÜLTÜR ÜZERİNDEKİ ETkİSI:
SÜMERBANK
Aylin Olcay Göçer
Danışman: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Oğuz Babüroglu
Özelleştirmenin, ekonomik ve finansal yönleri detaylı 
bir şekilde araştırılmıştır. Ancak, bu konunun insan kaynağı 
ve kurumsal kültür yönleri araştırılmamış ve çalışanlar 
üzerindeki etkileri incelenmemiş tir.
Bu tezin amacı, Sümerbank'tâki kültürü ortaya çıkarmak; 
özelleştirmenin, çalışanlar üzerindeki olası etkilerini 
incelemek; özelleştirmenin ekonomik ve finansal varsayımları 
ile Sümerbank’ın kurumsal kültürü arasında doğan çatışmayı 
sergilemek; ve Sümerbank kültürüne uygun yeni bir 
özelleştirme stratejisi önermektir.
Anahtar kelimeler: özelleştirme, 
Sümerbanklılık.
kurumsal kültür.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privatization has gradually become a major phenomenon 
through the eighties. Like many other countries, Turkey is 
undertaking an extensive privatization program that started 
in the early 1980s. In general terms it is defined as the 
transfer of ownership or control of an enterprise from the 
government to the private sector. Privatization in Turkey has 
two purposes related to one another, the first of which is to 
remove concerns from the area of the State's direct control 
and intervention, and the second, to reduce the assortment of 
burdens which these organizations impose upon the national 
budget (44). The realization of these purposes necessitates 
some changes in the combination of business units, product 
lines and in structure, that is, in the corporate strategy of 
the organization. The decision and methods of privatization 
are determined by the Government. Pr iv.atization is a 
government policy, a political choice made within the 
economic program of the ruling Motherland party (16). 
Although, the privatization is the Government's chosen 
strategy for restructuring the economy, it is by and large 
an imposed corporate stategy for the SEEs. Since this was the 
Government's strategy, the SEEs did not have a choice 
regarding their inclusion in the privatization program.
While privatization has been well documented in terms 
of economic and financial analysis, little has been written 
from the human resouces perspective and the issues of
organizational culture and privatization's impact on the 
employees have not been studied. Yet, when this strategy is 
being enacted, it will be impossible to ignore the effects 
privatization on the cul ture of the organization - Since 
privatization signifies a major change within the evolution 
of the SEES — most of which were founded during the nation 
building days of the Republic—  such a change should be 
viewed within the cultural dynamics of the organization. 
These cultural dynamics are generated by various interest 
groups — management, workers and owners— , with their 
differing opinions about the nature of the organization, the 
relative importance of their tasks, and their possible 
future positions wichin the organization create options 
which may become critical to the survival of the organization 
as a whole.,
Although these issues may be taken for granted when in 
harmony with the corporate strategy, changes that ignore them 
are fraught with peril,. They should be addressed coherently 
in mature organizations like Sumerbank (SEE), where the most 
important motivator for its employees has been its 
organizational culture. Nowadays, Sumerbank is at the stage 
of pre-privatization. If the cultural dynamics in Sumerbank 
is understood clearly, its strong organizational culture can 
be used to support and reinforce and the possible barriers to 
acceptance and understanding of the proposed strategy are 
reduced.
This study aims
to articulate the culture in Sumerbank
to examine the possible impacts of 
privatization on the employees,
to show the culture clash between the 
taken-for-granted economic and
financial assumptions of privatiza­
tion and the organizational culture 
of Sumerbank, and
to suggest a new privatization
strategy that is sensitive to the 
culture of Sumerbank.
In order to achieve the objectives, the first section 
examines the two major concepts --privatization and 
organizational culture-- of this study. In the second part, a 
description of the public policy, organizational goals, the 
current position of Sumerbank and some problems associated 
with its structure is provided. After defining the meaning of 
organizational culture and paradigm perspective, the culture 
in Sumerbank referred by its employees as "Sumerbankian" and 
its components are explored. Next, the impact of 
privatization in Sumerbank on the employees is interpreted 
through the concept of ambiquity paradigm. Finally, based on 
the findings, a new privatization strategy is proposed so as 
to smooth the path for successful privatization.
2.WHAT IS PRIVATIZATION?
Privatization is the transfer of ownership or control 
of an enterprise from the government to the private sector. 
Privatization has two purposes related to one another, the
first of which is_ to remove the concerns from the area of the 
State's direct control and intervention, and the second, to 
reduce the assortment of burdens which these organizations 
impose upon the national budget. The accomplishment of the 
first objective, which is the the most important of the two, 
necessitates, the transfer of ownership to a degree that will 
enable management to be turned over to private individuals 
and organizations. The second objective on the other hand, 
requires as far as possible, the entire operation be divested 
of, especially in the case of unproductive establishments 
which operate at losses or of organizations which have great 
f u. n d i n g r e q (.i i i'" e m e n t s . C- o m p 1 e t i o n a f m a j o r i t y interest 
di Vesti ture na tui'"a 11 y imp 1 ies privatization of mainagemen t as 
well. Nevertheless, in order for inanagement to be re 1 ease?d 
f rDm 1:he St¿ste ' s c.ontro 1 it is not obi iga>.tary to entire 1 v' 
iaiiiTixnate public ownership, A chanqis in ov^n'ership which 
enables the transition of management to private individuals 
and organizations is also within the definition of
"privatization" (33),
2,1. The Qb i ectives of Privatization
As stated in the privatization master plan of Turkey 
prepared by Morgan Bank in 1986, (45), the most important
objectives of privatization for the economy and the rationale 
behind these objectives are listed below;
To allQw matrket forces to stimu 1 ate the economy;
Private sector decisions are based primarily on economic
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factors. In the public sector, however, many decisions are 
made on political grounds to serve certain "community goals". 
Public sector managers are often not allowed the freedom to 
operate their companies according to market forces. 
Privatization would introduce market discipline to public 
enterprises and redirect company resources in the most 
efficient manner.
lii promote widespread share ownership:
The goal of widespread share ownership is important in 
reducing the concentration of economic power and to bring 
about a more equitable distribution of income and wealth.
speed ujQ. development oL tilS capital markets :
The basic prerequisites for the development of a successful 
capital market include a stable political/economic
environment, an adequate supply of stock, a sufficient demand 
for stock. and an efficient intermediary network. 
Privatization generally directly addresses the supply side 
issue by immediately making shares of stock available for 
private ownership. So, the savings accumulated in the economy 
can be transformed into investments.
In order to achieve these ob.jectives of the economy, 
some targets of the enterprises should be identified, such 
as :
lû increase productivity and. efficiency:
Lack of profit orientation, poorly defined goals, and no 
accountability to stockholders have decreased incentives for
public enterprises to increase productivity and efficiency. 
Other discrepancies between efficiency ratings of public and 
private firms include manpower levels and equipment use. 
Market discipline and consumer choice tend to keep private 
firms more efficient.
To. ingrease, the quality. quantity. and the diversity iif. the 
goods and services :
In the absence of market oriented management, public 
operations tend to become production oriented; so the quality 
and consumer ability to choose decrease. Public firms have 
little or no incentives to seek new products due to both the 
limited number of firms competing within the market place, 
and lack of profit orientation.
2.2. Methods of Privatization
The question of which method of privatization is to be 
implemented .should be determined in conjunction witli the 
general economic situation of the country, with the type of 
enterprise to be divested of, and with the purpose to which 
emphasis is to be given. So, it would be more intelligent to 
apply various methods together according to the circumstances 
and conditions rather than to emphasize one of the following 
methods (42). This idea can also be supported by Mrs. Nermin 
Berki:
"...All countries in the world have developed their own 
rationales and systems of privatization through a trial and 
error. At the transition stage, .Turkey examined the 
privatization program of other countries, made an analytical
study to evaluate the current situation of State Economic 
Enterprises and asked the opinions of the workers, 
journalists etc. and developed a privatization master plan (6).··
In the privatization master plan, the methods of 
privatization are stipulated as follows:
a) Sale of Stock Through the Capital Market
b) Stock Sale by Requesting Bids
c) Direct or Special Sale
d) Joint Pub 1ic/Private Sector Ventures
e) Leasing and Management Contracts
(The details about the privatization methods are described in 
the appendix.)
2.3. Privatization in Turkey
At the helm of the decision-making process of
privatization mechanism, is the Housing Development and 
Public Participation Administration, which is under the 
control of the Prime Minister's Office. This Fund 
restructures and prepares a SEE before the sale and decides 
how, to whom, when and how much to sell. Then, the High Board 
of Planning, whose members are cabinet ministers, decides on 
the investment alternatives with the money generated by the 
sale. In that process, the responsibility of the sale belongs 
to the Government. This responsibility is explained by 
Mr.Adnan Kahveci; a parliament member, as follows:
"...We, as a government, are responsible to the public who 
wants productive enterprises and to protect the rights of 
Turkish nation; so to find a way to improve productivity of
SEES that are operated at a loss (15)".
As of now, Turkey has been able to privatize three big 
enterprises, namely, Teletas, Petkim and Citosan. For Teletas 
and Petkim, the method of privatization was the sale of 
stocks through the capital market. In both cases, Housing 
Development and Public Administration Participation bought 
more than half of the stocks and sold the rest to the public. 
In the Citosan's case, the four factories of Citosan were 
sold to a French company. In the bylaws of the agreement, the 
condition was to sell 407. of the stocks of Citosan to the 
public within five years, (undisclosed to the public when the 
research was conducted), was stated.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
An organization is an explicit attempt to control
■s in o r d e r  t o P r o u Li c e goods ¿ind /  0 1^"
m ost o r g a n i s a i l i o n s  a r e s e t  up f o r
V0S j, 1 j  e h a V .1 o t’" c o n t r o i r e q u i r e s an
the
s u c h u t i 1 i t a r i a n o o j e c 
understanding of social and political considerations.
Since it is assumed that culture affects the change in 
the organization, the meaning of the organizational culture 
that will help the understanding of the discussion should be 
defined.
Organizational culture is defined in terms of values, 
expectations, underlying assumptions and shared meanings, 
that is transferred through the generations, among the 
members of the organizsition. Every organization has its own
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unique culture that ties its employees to the organization 
and holds the organization together. The potency of 
organizational culture depends on the social context in which 
they function and how and by whom they are created as well as 
how they are maintained and kept alive. The organization 
perpetuates itself through the culture (29 and 37).
In this study, the paradigmatic perspectives to 
organizational culture of Martin and Meyerson (38) is used to 
portray the Sumerbank's case. By paradigmatic perspective 
they mean a particular view of how culture should be studied. 
Their assumption is that members of the organization, may 
either be unconsious of some aspects of their culture or 
simply take it for granted. Furthermore, the culture is 
enacted, not observed. Thus, a view of a culture from a 
particular paradigmatic perspective aims to be a more 
subjective approach.
There are three types paradigms: integration, 
differentiation and ambiguity.
Integration paradigm emphasizes consistency among 
cultural manifestations and organization-wide consensus among 
cultural members. It defines the culture as that which 
cultural members share --the glue that holds an organization 
together.
Differentiation paradigm stresses inconsistency and 
delineated lack of consensus, usually in the form of 
overlapping, nested subcultures and stresses a cultural 
context that is devoid of strong leaders. It portrays the
organizational culture from the internal conflict point of 
view (29).
In the ambiguity paradigm;, cultural manifestations are 
neither clearly consistent nor clearly inconsistent. 
Differences in interpretation are seen as incommensurable, 
irreconcilable and unavoidable. Ambiguity paradigm is found 
in three types: uncertainity, confusion and contradiction.
The culture of Sumerbank, that is the long lasting 
notion of Sumerbankian, can be portrayed under the paradigm 
of integration. However, ambiguity paradigm better decribes 
the organizational culture when the privatization question 
is invoked.
4. METHODOLOGY
From the extensive literature survey carried out on 
privatization (33), it is seen that the significance of the 
concept of organizational culture is not examined in tiie 
context of privatization. Therefore, this paper aims to be a 
descriptive and exploratory field study that examines the 
impact of privatization on Sumerbank’s culture. Observations 
on Sumerbank plants and retail stores, and in-depth 
interviews with managers, workers and other related people 
from concerned organizatizations and/or institutions, 
consitute the primary data. The study started with  ^the 
observations in Izmir-Sumerbank plants and Ankara-Sumerbank 
retail stores in order to have a general idea about the life 
in Sumerbank. Then, a base of conversation was built with the
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workers and civil servants by asking them if they were happy 
to work in Sumerbank. Following their common response that 
they were happy to work in Sumerbank and to be a 
"Sumerbankian'’, these people were asked to explain what they 
meant by being a "Sumerbankian". After understanding that the 
organizational culture in Sumerbank was referred as 
"Sumerbankian”, the study focused essentially on two open- 
ended questions. These were "what is the importance of being 
a Sumerbankian for you?” and "how will privatization affect 
Sumerbank and its culture?". About thirty five people were 
interviewed during October and November of 1989. Ten out of 
them wanted neither to give their names nor to mention their 
positions. Since privatization is an imposed strategy by the 
Government, at this stage, the higher the interviewees in 
respective organizations the better informed they wex^ e about 
this program. Since the selected people were relatively more 
informed about privatization and aware of the notion of 
organizational culture at tlie last stage of the intex'views, 
there were no need to build a base for asking these 
questions. However, most of the lower level employees were 
not only uninformed about the effects of privatization but 
also afraid of the consequences of this uncertain situation.
The current president, three vice-presidents, a general 
secretary, two former presidents, two middle level managers, 
two civil servants and five workers in Sumerbank, two members 
from employers' union and five members from employees' union, 
five high level managers from Housing Development and Public
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Administration, a legal consultant from State Planning 
Organization,, a president from Citosan, a parliament member, 
a cabinet minister of Labor and Social Security and the head 
of Social Democratic Party were interviewed. These responses 
reflect their interpretations of the notion of being a 
Sumerbankian and expectations about the pre-privatization 
stage. All interviews were written up as soon as the 
interviews were completed and a content analysis was 
performed in order to delineate the Sumerbankian notion of 
the organizational culture and to assess the impact of 
privatization on it.
5.SUMERBANK
5.1 . F u b 11 c Pol icv and Q r a an i z a fc i o n a 1 Goals ü JI Samerban.k
Before the round at ion of Su.Tierbank, i.n ly30, there v-ias 
only one shayak factory in Turkey; there were no earthenware., 
paper., cellulose, iron and steel industries. The ciotnes of 
civil and military people were imported (24). Founded in 
193.3 to contribute to the industrialization of the young 
Turkish Republic, Sumerbank, being a State Economic 
Enterpri.se, has successfully completed its task of setting up 
the essential branches of industry and providing the basic 
needs of the nation within 52 years.
In the Sumerbank handbook, the missions of this 
enterprise can be described as follows:
"...To work between the public and private sectors in the
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area of industry with the specific aim of encouraging the 
foundation of major industries...”
”...To foster the education of personnel who will take part 
in the development of Turkish industry..."
"...To take active measures to improve Turkish industry..."
"...To monitor industrialization in its accomplishment by 
means of a more harmonious and effective use of all national 
resources and economic factors..."
"...To improve urban/regiorial balance..."
"...To maintain and improve employment opportunities..."
Other objectives included the spread of secure 
industrial employment widely across the country and the 
provision to mass consumers certain basic goods at
relatively low prices. Ttiase ¡.ibjeccives are stateel by an old 
3 u. m e r b a n k i. a n :
", . , oumerb-ank b u i l t  nev? f a c t o r i e s  and r e t a i l  .stores
d i s r ega  rd :i.ng reg 1 ona i d i f  f e r ■ jnc es in Tu r k e . The aim wa.s
Li'jv?er p r · : . '!.■’ ,1 to !ju n .service arid :!ur.i.ij.ty ‘, ' ¿ 4 ) . "
By founding, admini.stering" and improving industrial 
establishments like cement, iron, steelmills, paper and 
cellulose factories throughout the country, Sumerbank has 
justly .started to be referred as "The school of Industry" . 
Later Sumerbank transferred these factories to other 
enterprises and deal mainly with textile industry.
5.2. Current Position oi. Sumerbank
In the textile sector, the existence of many 
substitutes cause high competition. In this sector, the cost 
advantage is gained by integrated plants, high technology and
economies of scale.
At present, Sumerbank is composed of 41 establishments, 
factories and associated companies, and equity participation 
in 31 other companies active in various industries. 
Additionally, Sumerbank has 44 bank branches and 466 retail 
stores scattered throughout Turkey's 71 provinces. The 
combined services of these institutions associated with 
Sumerbank constitude an important share of Turkey's total 
production in the fields of cotton, wool, chemical, 
porcelain, and leather industries. With respect to the share 
in the total production in Turkey, Sumerbank has 11% in shoe 
production, 15% in woolen production, 100% in viscose and 
cellophane production.
Sumerbank has 466 retail stores throughout Turkey. The 
system of its distribution channels is one of the most 
important advantage of Sumerbank in this sector. In many 
small towns and villages of Turkey, especially in the eastern 
part of Turkey, Sumerbank is the only store (22).
The retail stores' gross margin is much below than that 
of private sector's (Exhibit 1). Although Suraerbank retail 
departments do not use intermediary wholesalers (unlike 
private sector), the gross profit is only one third of that 
of private sector (14% vs. 35%), because of the excessive 
prices paid to the manufacturer. Furthermore, return on 
investment of retail stores of Sumerbank is also much below 
than the private sectors' (Exhibit 2). In addition to 
these, Sumerbank's inventory turnover is below average due to
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ineffective inventory control (Exhibit 3).
There are tight linkages between manufacturing, retail 
and banking groups of Sumerbank. In 1988, 85% of retail 
division's purchases were from either wholly owned or 
associate Sumerbank manufacturing plants, over 98% of the 
Banking Division's loans went to Sumerbank businesses; and 
41% of the manufacturing group's external sales were to -the 
Retailing Division (42).
Sales of Sumerbank is not only through the retail 
stores. Retail store sales constitute only 50% of total 
sales. Other sales are clustered around exports (15%), 
textile products (15%), and institutional sales (20%) (45).
Current position of Sumerbank has been achieved at a 
high cost. Appropriate management information is lacking at 
the individual business unit level. Also, there is no 
reliable information on profitability of business units. At 
the divisional level, financial results have been distorted 
by the transfer prices for both inputs and outputs which did 
not reflect market prices and by allocations of finance 
charges which were not related to borrowing by those 
divisions (42). These factors tend to lead to inefficiency 
and unprofitable operations at many Sumerbank factories.
In the manufacturing sector, Sumerbank employs 21,781 
personnel in its 18 plants consisting 7,242 looms. Sumerbank 
produces 220 million meters per year of cotton cloth as well 
as 51,000 tons of cotton yarn, which represents 15% and 12% 
of Turkey's production of these two goods, respectively.
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According to a reorganisation report carried out by the 
Boston Consulting Group in 1985, there are two essential 
factors for Sumerbank. to be successful: new technology and 
qualified labor force. The machinery in Sumerbank are between 
6 and 50 years old. Cost of goods are affected by the 
machine ages. The relation between additonal costs and 
machine years can be seen from Exhibit 4. The cost of 
modernization of the factories is so high that Sumerbank is 
unable to finance them within its current means (45).
Furthermore, manufacturing plants have had little 
freedom to make major commercial decisions independently. 
Individual shops and bank branches have had little autonomy 
and perhaps consistent with little autonomy, the reward 
system for satisfactory financial results is not 
sufficient (42 ) .
Since Suraerbank was founded, the banking 
department has been respon.sible for supplying financial 
resources required by its factories and other businesses of 
the organizations. However, the problem with the Bank 
nowadays is that it not only is not profitable but it has 
also shifted away from its mission. Salih Ela, the deputy 
manager of finance, said that:
"Sumerbank was originally founded as an Investment Bank; but 
today, we are far away from this mission, we exist for 
solving the financial problems. The bank should act as a 
commercial bank, separate from Sumerbank Holding, and should 
operate as a profit center rather than a cost center."
Sumerbank, recently, suffers from the high cost of
16
money- It is collecting money from the public by means of 
deposit accounts and issuing bonds. The existing banking 
regulations in Turkey do not allow the banks to use 55% of 
money we collect", said Mr.Ela. The cost of money that flows 
to production and other businesses is very expensive.
53. Organisational Struc ture of Sumer bank
There is a strong ethos of public services and 
discipline. Sumerbank tends to be production driven rather 
than being marketing driven. Its structure is centralised. 
The decisions traditionally taken in Ankara and usually do 
not account for the changes in the marketing environment of 
the individual 1 busine?ss units (42).
There are few incentives to take risks and business 
units have been protected from competition. The incentive 
system of Sumerbank offers a a one time bonus of 50% of the 
salaries for the personnel of a store, if the store achieves 
30% increase in sales compared to the previous 'year. There 
are no incentives for the indi'vidual but there is some for 
the group of employees working within the store. Unless the 
store as a whole can exceed 1.5 times the previous year's 
sales, the group will not get any premium.
The high centralization of decision making, and 
hierarchy of authority tend to result in vertical 
communication. As would be expected in most bureaucracies, 
the dominant form of horizontal coordination is through 
paperwork and reports, and every task is rigidly defined and
17
written up in manuals. Even high level employees deal with a 
lot of bureaucracy which makes policy making difficult and 
frustrates the management. This is expressed by a manager in 
Sumerbank:
"It is very hard to be imaginative to change something 
because it needs a lot of effort and time (7)",
Sumerbank is employing 21 ¡,781 personnel. There are 
about 17,000 excess labor according to the determined "norm 
staff" of Sumerbank (39). Personnel in Sumerbank are divided 
into three status: workers, civil servants and- special
contracted personnel. The education level of the sales people 
is lower than the average of Turkey. Sales personnel in many 
stores are not even secondary school graduates (11).
The management of Sumerbinnk has in recent years mstde 
substantial efforts to increase oroductivity, such as 
decreasing the number of excess labor or employing younger 
managers. Nevertheless, previously established practices 
prevail and the enterprising potential of the many managers 
i s b a r e1у tapped.
6. FINDINBS
6.1. The Culture in Sumerbank
The creation of the organisational culture dates back 
to 19305, the time of its foundation by Atatürk. Culture 
endures to the degree of its content transmitted from one 
generation to the next, as well as of maintaining the factors
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that employees are happy with. Hung on the wall of the old 
employee, there is a letter, given to him to congragulate his 
20 years in Sumerbank, which goes as follows:
"...who has a very happy 20 successful years in Sumerbank, 
the biggest and the most distinguished organization of our 
country".
This reflects the importance of their organization 
and also reinforces the role of Sumerbank as depicted in the 
mission of the organization. The organizational culture in 
Sumerbank is inferred by the notion of being a "Sumerbankian” 
that was a term regularly used by the respondents. An 
analysis of the interviews revealed four components of the 
culture in Sumerbank. These were social responsibility, a 
big family, the school of Sumerbank and the colony life. 
These notions of the being Sumerbankian clearly fit into the 
integration paradigm whereas as we will see once we discuss 
the Sumerbankian notion, the culture that is emerging as a 
result of the privation strategy can better be described 
within the ambiguity paradigm (38).
Sumerbarikian is expessed with the integration paradigm 
because there is consistency about the meaning of its 
culture. It is perceived and shared among all the levels in 
the organization in the same way. From the interviews with 
different related people, it is understood that there is 
consensus among the employees of Suraerbank about the 
definition of their organizational culture which commits them 
to Sumerbank.
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The four components of Sumerbankian are in harmony with 
each other. Their orientation is the social life. A 
discus.sion of these components are as follows.
6.1.a. Social Responsibility
What Is meant by the social responsibility of Sumerbank 
is to build a way of life that fits the rationalization and 
modernization objectives of the newly developed Turkish 
Republic. This responsibility, one of the corporate 
objectives of Sumerbank, is a component of its culture. 
Sharing the economic and social responsibilities of their 
organization make the employees commit to the objecbi.ves of 
the org'-an L zat ion , and so to i.iiij organización.
Tlie new .jumerbank facti.n'ies founded in IdoOs throughout 
Turkey ijliangeri riie .;oc.;.ai a.nci economic in f ras t me cur e of its 
ci isles .'ind I'jn Ir ibu ced to their deva lopmeri cs . Tome '-cíaníP i.as 
to siiOt/ i: iiose '.Oirj.n.ues 'O'·!.!·! uk· f o .1.1: ■ w;·: ;
...iiaia.cya onmarbarik was built in 1938. Besicie cne i'actory 
itseif, Tumer Barber, Sumer Harket, Sumer Res cau ran t, .inmer 
!1 igh-sclioo 1, Sumer SI:.rent coair¡ be .seen in I,he cicy (34;'.''
in addition to bringing services and facilities both 
to its own employees and to the residents of the cities it 
founded, Sumerbank made these cities beautiful.
The establishment of a Sumerbank in Adana made the city 
more beautiful with the parks and green areas around the 
factory. "
Sumerbank also helped to solve the infrastructure and
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housing problems of the Turkish people as is told by the 
following respondents:
"...The roads and the electricity reached Eregli with the 
foundation of Sumerbank (24)."
"...In Eregli, Sumerbank bought the area, built houses and 
sold these to its employees cheaply. That is to say, it 
helped to solve one of the social problems: housing (24)."
In those years, people generally earned their lives 
from agriculture. With 1933, new concepts emerged — a place 
to work, a big organization, an industry. After then, people 
who were traditionally farmers and were working with their 
families for themselves started to work for the Government 
and to learn industrial .skills. This transition started to 
change the life style and conservative orientation of the 
Turkish people. Since they are working in an organisation 
with many other different people, they learned to live 
togetiier and ro i:^ ommuriicate with eac.h other. T!ie 'ïxainpie 
below shows that employees adapted to the new environment 
within a short period of time.
In 1366, members of the Board of Directors visited 
Adiyaman Sumerbank:
"...It was the first years of Sumerbank in Adiyaman. The 
Board of Directors asked the workers what their complaints 
were. The main complaint was that the women working in the 
factory did not want to get closer with the men working in 
the same factory and to work with them at the same place. 
After 6 months, the Board of Directors went to Adiyaman 
again. When they were talking with the workers, they said 
that they wanted a garage for the girls' bicycles. The 
women were riding to the factory on their bicycles."
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The employees of Sumerbank consider themselves a big 
family. The State has the "father" image who protects , cares 
for and helps this family. When one of the workers dies, the 
State helps the rest of his family and provides a place to
live. The members of this big family care for each other as
well. When a worker in Erzincan-Sumerbank becomes ill and
should be treated in Ankara, any worker in Ankara-Sumerbank 
will help and care for the worker voluntarily. This mutual 
understanding has existed for many years. Sumerbank has a 
special meaning for its employees. It becomes more than a 
place to work .as a secretary gives the above example.
Since I,heir grand f.others and fathers worke'l there, 
it becomes like i.rad i. tion in tiie f.amiiy. They S3.y that 
Sumerbank i.s th-eir own Г actor y One of the re.oson for l;.heKi to 
f e e i Li к e о w n e r s i, : t· 11 a t i t L.i e c о mes а l i i;' e - t.:. me e « ir.j 1 ^ ■ у a ie r i L . 
Since none of i:.he workers are terminateti riithour, .a very 
important reason (generaliy,. the reason for termination is 
retirement), they do not consider them.selve.s as temporary 
workers к worker at the retail store in hlus-Ankara put this 
in the followin.g way:
6 .1 . b . Sumerbank as. a Big Family
"...1 love Sumerbank. hy mother who is now retired, did not 
have a problem with Sumerbank; then I started my job in 
Sumerbank and after me, my brother joined Sumerbank. It has 
been my family's working place for 60 years" says one of 
the eraployeees to make this point".
Sumerbank has educated its employees not only socially 
but also technically. Today, many managers of the private 
firms were trained and get experienced in is termed "the 
School of Industry." The notion of being a "Sumerbankian", 
some general information about Sumerbank, the type of work 
and the importance of Sumerbank in Turkey are taught in the 
training program carried out at the Sumerbank Training 
Center in Bursa. The first topic of the first course of this 
program is is its history and the important place of it in 
the industraiization of Turkey.
Beside its own training' program to the employees, since 
1970s it has .given scholarships to its employees and their 
children to no train them in specialised fields (18). To be 
t.r.3.ined wittrin the same system and educated in tlie same
6.1. c . Suitierbank sl "School"
e ri V i r o ri m e n t ij i\ i. ■;i tne bases r:'or tight .■ o mruu[1.1'j t I. o ri i i n Ks
among' ['.he members of the ‘.'rg3.n i z.ation .
Furthermore, Sumerbank has been tlie recruting ground 
for many private oorporation.s in Turkey. Sumerbank's trained 
and experienced managers are regularly recruited to various 
private firms. As such Sumerbank as an organization functions 
as "The School of Industry."
6.1.d . Sumerbank as a "Colony" ,
Most of the factories are away from the center of the 
city so the employees refer to themselves as a "colony". One 
of the managers in Sumerbank explained what they mean by 
colony:
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"Their working places and homes are within the boundary of 
Surnerbank area- Their children play together in the parks of 
Sumerbankj, and when they grow up, their education is 
supported by the scholarships that Sumerbank provides., then 
they work for Sumerbank just like their parents used to. So^ 
the culture in the "colony" is transferred among the 
generations (2)-"
ThGise colonies are the social groups within 
Sumerbank that do not take part in the production process but 
reinforce the notion of being a Sumerbankian- The members of 
these colonies live together and share everything that is 
provided them by Sumerbank^ within the boundaries of the 
CO 1ony.
Since the structure of living in all colonies of 
SLimer bank is vei·"'v 5iiTii i ar*, thie no tiori of Sliinei'"bank ian is 
c c:) n i s t e n t 11·"! r o u g h o u t t h e c:; r g a n i c a t i o n .
6 u2n The .liiiiia c. t Of. P yn. WMl-itLllls!.
Considering the current position and having 
•f o r rn u. .1. a't e d 11* ie p r ci b J. e m s o f 3 u m e r b a n l< , s u c In a s p e r t o r iti a n c e 
deficiencies and ineTTiciency', need for a change in the 
corporate strategy is apparent.. This strategy chat has 
entered into' the corporate ^agenda as privatization j, will have 
a significant impact on the management of enterprise, the 
goals and objectives pursued and the decision making system. 
It is aimed at mainly efficiency, better quality and
competitiveness in the economy. The following objectives are 
expressed in the Sumerbank privatization report (42)s 
- to achieve competitiveness within the organization
·—I /1 ··+
- to minimize the need for redundancy
- to maximize sales volumes
When the organizational culture in Sumerbank is 
examined, it becomes apparent that Sumerbankian notion does 
not consist of the objectives of privatization. Also, the 
stated mission in the charter’ of Sumerbank does not directly 
include productivity and competitiveness related targets. 
This idea can be supported by Mr. Adnan Kahveci as follows:
"In Sumerbank, the employees know what does a "Sumerbankian” 
mean, but do not know what does "being productive" mean. It 
is time for them to learn it as well (15)".
When Sumerbank's culture has to deal with the culture 
of privatization that consists of very different 
asssumptions, a cultural clash may have to be considered. 
People who have never been directed to the ob.jectives of 
efficiency, better 'Quality and compe t i t i'/eness will be 
expected to internalize .such values when privatization is 
imposed in their organizational culture. This transition to 
the culture of privatization or a probable synthesis between 
the privatization and Sumerbankian assumptions of culture 
will result in cultural clash. This transitional culture can 
no longer be described within the integration paradigm 
because harmony and consistency that is central to. the 
integration view of culture can not be inferred anymore. 
The differentiation paradigm can also not be grounded because 
the existence of subcultures did not come out to be very 
significant in the analysis of the interviews. Therefore, the
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ambiguity paradigm seem to be most promising for interpreting 
the transitional culture. This stems from the fact that 
different interpretation of the impacts of privatization 
because it is neither fully understood nor communicated by 
the members of the organization. To fit this paradigm to the 
context of the Sumerbank's case, three types of ambiguity 
contradiction, confusion and uncertainity--, as suggested by 
Meyerson and Martin (38) will be discussed respectively.
Contradiction refers to cultural manifestations and 
interpretations that are capable of double meanings, as in a 
paradox or an irreconcilable conflict.
The notion of oumerbankian has a crucial role in the
survival of the organization, however. brings .some
contr.ad ic t ion.s when c-on side red in c. he context of 
privatization. Efforts to build and maintain the culture 
sometimes contradictf: with the fundamental principles of 
SEEs, which are mainly to provide services and benefits to 
the pjublic. They have at times maintain their culture at tlie 
expense of their principles. They use the capital of the 
State to improve the working environment of their employees 
and to increase the prestige of the organization. It is spend 
to design the green areas or the parking places within the 
boundaries of their factories or to add new service cars for 
their employees. Even though such motivators are necessary 
to increase satisfaction of the employees and to increase the 
quality of working life, it should not be at the expense and
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contradict with the fundamental principles. Mrs.N.Berki 
indicates this situation as:
■'...SEEs compete among themselves to provide services and 
benefits for their own employees and to consume the capitalof the State (6)".
One of the components of Sumerbankian notion is being a 
big family that has tight relations in itself. This family 
concept may contradict with one of the objectives of 
privatization which is competitiveness within the 
organi;j.?ition. Upto now, .such a contradiction has not occured 
because the members of this family have not dealt with 
having to be compel; i. 11 ve . ;h.ir,, t:hese ti.ght relations may 
cause difficulties in persuading the employees to compete 
with the either with cjiitsiders or v-iith members of their own 
families and to try hard for promotion.
Life-time employment has also po3}.t:. Lve .and negative 
impacts on the performance of the employees. Security about 
their future, on one hand, ra.akes them happy, on the other 
hand, may encourage .an unproductive attitude since they are 
not threatened by loosing their jobs. None of the 
interviewees mentioned productivity in their responses, 
therefore it can be concluded that the negative effect of 
life-time employment is not considered in the notion, of 
Sumerbank. However, privatization aims at productivity. 
Hence, the existing expectations in Sumerbank and the 
objectives of privatization will contradict with each other.
The other type of ambiguity, uncertainity, refers to
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the unpredictability of the organization's environment and 
technology. Particulalry, the trade union representatives' 
responses can be interpreted by uncertainty. They can not 
predict the consequences of privatization in the Turkish 
economy, industrialization and employment.
In general, the concerns of Teksif --the employee 
union in the textile industry-- about the privatization of 
Sumerbank are as followings:
"...Sale of these kind of enterprises prevents the 
industrialization process in our country. Unless Turkey 
reaches the level of developed countries, the sale of SEEs 
should not be placed in the agenda. Unemployment is one of 
the major problems of Turkey. The application of special 
contracted personnel endangers the job security of 
employees . "
Since the Housing Development .and Public Participation 
Adin in is t ra t ioii has not informed the trade unions about the 
privatization method of Pumerbank, I,heir ob.iections to i'.he 
inetii'^'U J.S case upon the previous experiences of other SEEs. 
For e.xample, Turk-Is, the confederation of the employee.‘3 ’ 
union, is against the way of the method of privatization 
undertaken in the Citosari s case. The pres’ident of Turk-is, 
Şevket Yilmaz says that the saie of SEEs to private firms, 
as a whole, is not the proper way to spread the capital to 
the public. When a SEE is sold to a private company, 
privatization loses its objective. However, he made it clear 
that they do not object to selling the stock to the public 
directly.
One of the unpredictable points’ is whether or not the
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employees will lose the rights of their indemnities. Tarim- 
Is argues that when a SEE is sold wholly, the employees will 
lose their rights because it will not be a SEE anymore but a 
new private company. The management of this new company may 
not account for the years spend in a SEE.
Another concern for the trade unions is the 
consideration of regional differences in privatization and 
the possible problems that will appear with privatization. 
Even though, Sumerbank its social tasks in the developed 
parts of Turkey, it has still responsibilities towards the 
underdeveloped ones. After privatization of the Sumerbank 
factories in underdeveloped regions, an uncertainity about 
the 'luestion of the social responsibility immediately can be 
recognized. A former oresideiit of Suiiierbank puts this issue 
in the f ci i lowing way:
"In eas'cern cxi'-ies oi Turkey, DLimerbank is the only place 
that people 'tan shop. There are 75 retail stores in the 
boundary area.s. In winter, when these people are unable to go 
to the big cities, Sumerbank satisfies their needs. If 
oumerbanks in eastern part of Tur.key are sold and the nev·? 
owners decide not to operate these factories or stores, who 
will .help these people 12.2;".
Furhtermore, privatization will change the social 
structure. It may cause the termination of unqualified, and 
unskilled excess labor. In this case, the problem is not 
lack of information, but the uncertainity about what will 
happen to the excess labor. This statement can be supported 
by Mr.Suleyman Gedik, a vice-president, as follows:
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"The excess labor resists to privatization because it is very 
hard for them to find another job, in case of termination. 
They are unskilled labor and employed because of some 
political pressures to the management. Privatization will not 
affect the real "Sumerbankians" negatively (11)".
By this statement, Mr. Gedik is implanting a 
distinction between the real and supposedly the un-real 
Sumerbankians. The reason for these structural changes and 
termination of this excess labor in Sumerbank is the attempt 
to decrease costs and increase efficiency. It is said that 
Sumerbank, as a SEE, will not be able to contiue its 
existence in such a problematic condition. The new 
Sumerbankian ethos is also supported by Mr.Okkes Ozuygur, the 
president of Housing Development and Public Participation 
Admin i s t r a t i on:
"Even S to.r.e-ovjned firms can not, in practice, finance 
overmanaging· over long periods. Lar.ge scale redundancies have
failed r, O match th.3.t of international competitorsefficiently. Remaining" employees' prospects will be brig'hter 
in privat j.,"ed lnoust:r i.es, which are sup-erior in ability to 
adapt, diversify and grow (19)".
Confusion i.s ivau.sed by lack, of knowledge or information 
that has not been communicated. In the pre-privatization 
stage, the employees in Sumerbank are not directly informed 
about the problems of their organization, the objectives and 
methods of the proposed strategy. Privatization will bring 
some changes to the existing situation of Sumerbank — the old 
technology may be renewed, the management structure may be 
changed and the excess labor may be reduced. These probable, 
but not definite changes will result in confusion because
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neither these changes nor their impacts are known. This 
confusion due to lack of knowledge will cause objections, as 
expressed by a worker:
"...I think SEEs should not be privatised. But do not ask me 
why- I do not know (a worker in Sumerbank).
Confusion causes barriers to acceptance because the 
employees want to be sure about their future positions. Since 
the employees were not involved in the planning, nor kept 
well informed of current and upcoming details of the change, 
they could only speculate about the real outcome. Their 
speculations were very emotional and reflected their 
insecurities. This discussion can be supported by:
"...What the employees know about privatisation is only the 
speculations in the newspapers. Employees have a negative 
attitude toward privatization because of lack of information. 
If the employees are informed about the meaning', reasons and 
results of privatization, they will .accept it. They should 
kn(5w that t.neir right.s will not cha.nge nor they will not be 
unemployed ■' 18;"
What happened in Suinerb8.nk Beykoz could be shown .as an 
example of tne importance of providing information and timely 
communication, in resolving the ambiguity:
"... Sumerbank in Beykoz was modernized by a German firm. As 
Germans did not have a dialogue with the employees, a 
reluctance appeared and production decreased to 40-45% of 
capacity. After they were informed about the reasons of 
modernization and that nobody would lose his/her job, ' the 
production started to increase (18)".
Another example to show the importance of the 
information is t.he Citosan's case. Neither the trade unions
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nor the employees were informed about their future positions 
-whether ttiey would be employed or terminated. So, the 
confusion about the job .security gave rise to negative 
attitudes toward privatization among the employees. But, when 
Cimse-Is was informed formally by the Housing Development and 
Public Participation Administration, after 3 months from the 
sale of Citosan, the ambiguity decreased significantly (10).
7.PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
In case of ambiguity caused by a change within an 
organization, attention should be focused on building
consistency among the employees because the success of r.nh i
proposed change depends upon the acceptance and support of 
t he employees. !in leí:?; itons i.stenoy is aciixeved in the 
organization about the emer.gent 'luiture, neither tlie 
ob i ec t .1 .· e?.: ■■.d' p r i an c i .Sfi r. i ■.n· rinr l.he concern?; i.d' '.he emp'i.oyee 
can be rco.iiz.ec. tirins is tency can be achieved tiirough 
3. n f o r II a. 13. o n > p e r s u a i t': i o n , 13 o mmu n i 0 a t:. i (,3 n . in v o 1 ve m e n t 3 n d
ownership .
Ttie managemfint need.s t.he oleare?; t po?jsibie i.nd icat ion.s 
of the action which members are likely to support 
who lehfaart iy , .-;inoe ?jucce.s.sf u i implementation almost totally 
depends upon people who feei personnaiy committed to a new 
action. The change should be explained in culturally and 
organizationally understood terms relying on shared 
as.sumptions that would help to interpret the messages. Hence, 
privatization should be explained by someone who is
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creditable and shares the same culture. Especially, in 
Sumerbank, family relations and the notion of paternalism 
have strong influence on the employees. They trust and 
believe in their superiors, as expressed by two of the 
workers:
..For 60 years, my family has never had a problem with the 
superiors. I am not afraid of privatization because I 
believe that they will consider us and will not apply 
something that will make us worse off." (a worker)
". . .If those at the top say that privatization is necessary, 
they certainly know better than us. Hopefully, it will be 
good for us" (a worker)·
Therefore, making the employees understand their 
culture, persuading them, making them feel secure about 
their future and work for the success of this new structure
s li o u i d be 
Sumerbank. 
commitment
under the resp'Ons ibi lity of tlie managers in 
Han.agers have a r;ruciai rol.e in building 
as Mr.Erkan fapan, the former president of
Sumerbank says;
"...Building oommitinenr, is the responsibility of the manager 
and is the ability that differs a good manager from a bad 
one. First of all, the manager himself, should love his 
organization, know the characteristics of it and believe in 
it. Then, he can spread out his vision to the 
employees (22)".
The employees and trade unions will best adapt to 
a change if they participate in the decision making. 
Considering the low turnover and the work experiences of the 
employees, Suraerbank will be a good place for an involvement 
program which may work as a catalizer at the pre­
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privatization stage. A board can be formed consisting of 
members of trade unions, managers of the enterprise to be 
privatized and representatives of Housing Development and 
Public Participation Administration to discuss the subject, 
define the problems of Sumerbank and to explain the strategy 
to be followed. Through the trade unions, the employees can 
be informed and persuaded. Furthermore, the objectives, 
methods and consequences of the privatization should be 
explained to the public through seminars, conferences, panel.s 
and the press. As Gunes Tañer, the cabinet Minister 
responsible ror privatization, admitted in· First 
Privatization Panel on 12 December, 1989 that their mistake
w 3. s l i e l a c k o r  p n b i i e  r e .1. a t  i o n s  . ¡’ h e c e s :i s  t, a n  o e t o
p r  .i. v a t iz a t L n h e s a i d w a s  b e c r d u s e L tie r e  w a s i i i s u i :  1: Li 1 e  n t
r.:' jiriilJU iJ i « ; i:. i o n  .
: (' · ' i r 1 V(f {*ien a 'di.-iM r.i r i. V' . : 1 ,5lirr;) i15 i ! ■ .-i i;. ovi ■1 n ri
e x p  i  a  i I 1 0 f ani..i u e i !. Liritie r s L o o r i  . i " . h e r e m a y s :: i. i j e i 1 a r  r l e  L; 's t n
i. 1.. I'j rit) ' ;  1 P r a n  c e . ■■['he b a s  i. r: b a r r ' L e r  zc) a o o e p t . a n c e i. 51 t h e n e e r j
for secujrity for the future. The employees should be 
persn.aded tliat overerap loymen r, is not a reasonable solution 
for decreasing the national unemployment rate. New industries 
that will be founded with the money generated by the sale, 
will provide employment opportunities for the laid-off labor. 
Some alternatives should be proposed to solve the 
overemployment problem, such as by encouraging voluntary 
redundancies with a lump sum compensation; or by taking 
measures to create employment opportunities by (42):
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- Enterprise schemes, that is to promote new business start 
ups through a package of measures such as provision of 
credits and professional advice.
Retraining for those individuals whose current skills are 
no longer in demand. There are benefits in planning training 
schemes in advance of workforce reductions with attention 
paid to developing those skill.s which are in short supply, 
and to ensure removal of any obstacles (financial and 
practical) .
Promotion of relocation through the dissemination of 
information or .job opportunities in other areas and financial 
a.ssistanoe with the cost of relocation. Opportunities for 
alternative employment may o k Is L at some distance from the 
.supply of tiie redundant labour.
Thie q u e s t i o n L 'or  t h e  e m p i o y e e s  o f ounie r b a n k i s  t  ÍIe i. ii‘
r .L jLJ h t. S i f  u ideKin.L ' : 'u id  id'ie i ? e d u n d a n e y  1; o s 1 3 , ^?hı<.м■ ! a . r e
b a s e d  oi:i t i l e  t e n u r e a n d  w a g e  r a f e  o f  t h e eirip .L ' j y e e s i i i j u i d  b e
•'dn s w e r v e d i n  d e t a i l . T h e  a i n o u n r  o f  t h e s e i n d  emn .i t i e s  r a n g e
between TL4.7 billion, the least, and TL7.1 billion, at most. 
Redundancy payment ilabilities for all its workers was about 
TL300 billion at December 1989. It is very hard for Sumerbank 
to pay this amount in cash. The employees should be assured 
that their rights will be protected either by transferring 
the responsibility to the new owners or paying some amount 
of the indemnities with stocks. In the sale of the 4 plants 
of Citosan (a cement industry), the first alternative was 
applied. Also, their rights of unionization was protected.
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Now, Cimse-Is (trade union) has no complaints about its and 
its members current position. This example should be 
communicated that the employees will not lose their rights of 
indemnities and unionization.
The reason behind the trade unions' objections against 
privatization is because they think they will lose their 
power after privatization (15). An example to support this 
reason is as followings:
"Elazig cotton industry plant is private. Many times it was 
sold but none of the owners tried to improve it, or buy new 
machines; instead, they ran the old system, earned some money 
and closed it. Every time the owner closed it, the employees 
lost their job. In such a case, the union can not go and ask 
the factory not to bo closed, bsc.3.use it is private. On the 
other t'land , in the public sector, the unions 'vari exert 
politic.ai pressure on decision makers."
L' u u i: e p o s i. t  1. 0 n r.) r t: hi e 1: r  ad  e u 11 i  n i·:: n i...' u i  d a i  o  0 a
'-.'jO 3-S' L ' j !.l I n c r e a s e t h e  b a r r  1 >3 r S . i n a; 3 3. .-.i’ r\. o f  t h e
i  n <■.) 3 e n <.i i c i i  r. h*a ! J V i 7 ii i-. i  Z; a t i ' j n .  As  iv^ng I^S t h e r e
iden t if ied
L i n i o n . s  v u .
arc workers there will be unions to protect their rights. 
Communication y-jill help to give r,hi.s messag'e to the trade 
unions and t··.) make them feel .secure. One of the ob.jections 
toviard privatization consider.s the possible problems about 
the differences in regions. Government will need to take 
social and strategic factors into the consideration in 
deciding which SEEs to privatize. The regions that 'still 
needs the services of Sumerbank should be identified and the 
sale of oumerbank factories in those regions should be 
delayed. Sumerbank factories in eastern part of Turkey, 
especially those in the borders, have not completed their
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■aspecialiv those in the borders,, have not completed their 
social tasks. The Government should take this concern into 
account.
□ne way of making the Sumerbankians to support 
privatization is ownership. They already feel that they are 
like the owners of Sumerbank. Therefore, to make them real 
owners, that is to say to sell the stocks of Sumerbank to 
Sumerbank employees will motivate the employees to be 
productive for their own factories.
.A questionnaire was carried out by Housing Development 
and Public Participation Administration in one of the private 
cement plaints in Konya, daited Nov. 23-24, 1989. The personnel
was asked whether they would like to be not only an employee 
о f t h e о r q a n i z ai t i о n b u t also a n a w n e r . A 1 m о s t all о f the 
a fi 5 w e r в ( 2 i ь о и. t a f 2 i 7 ) w e r e p о s i t i v e . The у b e 1 i eve t h a t 
being an owner would increase therir productivity as well as
1"‘10 .i .1П c cj ГГ10 i:
a. CONCLUSION
This study aproaches privatization from organizational! 
culture and human resources perspectives. While the topic has 
been well documented in terms of financial and economic 
aspects, the impacts of privatization on the employees have 
been neglected.
In this study, organizational culture in Sumerbank 
which is referred to as being a "Sumerbankian" and the impact 
of privatization are examined from paradigmatic perspectives.
The culture of Suraerbank is interpreted under the integration 
paradigm because there is consistency about the meaning of 
the culture tdiroughout the organization. However, when
privatization is imposed, there appears a cultural clash. 
This clash has resulted from the difference between the 
assumptions behind the Sumerbankian notion and privatization. 
The pre-privatization stage of Suraerbank is interpreted under 
the ambiguity paradigm to refer to what seems unclear. This 
paradigm i.s distinguished into three in order to explore the 
culture of transition: contradiction, confusion and
uncertainity.
fJons ider  ing the d i f f  icu i t, i e s  at th i s  t r a n s i t i o n a l  s tage  
some p r o p o s u 1 s a r e o u i  t o a c h i '-3 v e c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h i n 
duraerhaiil': Tiie iiriportance of  communication, j.níó.irmat· li',n ,
p e rsua t i on ,  in vo i /^emen r, and ownership i.s aient irmcd
Î. i1 H"-' i i . cllb  1. y . r iri i iíü.i luïiS exist i.“ I'J r i. i 1 e s 1: u d y
i;. li t‘J htlf'i p:·’''P in ce rv ieoeri B:dÍ!l^¿ ;ii: the
i. c .Lijnal u:j.uses 'incertaini 1:;/ about t reF’.u i 1..s of
privatization. Host of the employees in Suraerbarik hesitacea 
j. .I·! ref l(î') ting t.heir '/iewf, 'iboul: o r i vat 1.1; at ion 0.11 d in 
answering the question of its po.ssibie effects. One reason of 
this hesitation is their ignorance about the strategy and the 
other i:s tlieir anxiety about tlieir future. Since 
privatization is an Imposed strategy which will probably 
result in extensive lay-offs, the employees were afraid of 
speaking against it.
furthermore, the interpretations depend on the limited
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number of interviewers who work in the big cities (Ankara and 
I^mir), either in Suinerbank and in other related 
institutions. A more extensive field study should be carried 
out to analysize the Sumerbank's culture.
In order to develop the argument on the effects of 
privatization on the employees and on the organizational 
culture further, a questionnaire should be conducted to 
systematically analyze the results.
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APPENDIX
Methods of Privatization
a) Sale of Stock Through the Capital Market
The Sale of Stock Through the Capital Market method can be 
defined as the sale of all or a part of the stocks of a 
publicly-owned joint-stock company to private individuals or 
organizations. The volume of stocks to be offered for sale 
ani'i the method of self! .ere o rer1e term i neti . .end .an announcement 
for sale is aiade, whereupon pcivatizacion will actually 
f ommence.
;.·■ ■ St ..r;l; oH İe .by Ueque.s r. ing B
In this iiielhijd, tlie sale of stock is reaii.zed !'.iy me.aiis of 
obta.ining i'jid.s particular i y from .groups rather than the
sale of the whole for partial lot on the stock market, in the 
anuiu.un'o'Hieri ts , it inigt))'. be uidicated that, .an .attempt wiJ.l be 
made to share the stock equally (33.3% each) .among the 
employees, the local populace and private firms.
c,) Direct or Special Sale
Direct or Special Sale method is more concerned with the sale 
of part of the SEE's assets, of their establishments, of 
their .secondary areas of activity, or of relatively small
40
businesses rather than its stock. In this method, the assets 
or enterprises to be sold may be turned over -by means of 
bargaining- to a specific firm, to several firms, or to a 
consortium. But, the drawback of this model is that since a 
sale of stock is not involved, it goes no further than a 
"selling off of state properties".
d) Joint Public/Private Sector Ventures
If Joint Public/Private Sector Ventures method is well 
organised, it can be one that brings together advantages for 
both sectors. New investments are undertaken by joint-stock 
companies in which the public and private sectors participate 
iiT preset ratios.
e ) L e a .s i  n g a n o· M .a n a g e ¡n e n I ■. \ ' i > 11 i ·. r a c t.. s;
These contracts do not envisage a transfer of ownersliip so 
they are ,  in J'act, einp Loyed to improve the performance of 
SEE's or to prep.are them L'or privatisation. In tiiis method,'
S.E.E ' B are leased to privat.e companies for specific time 
periods under the terms or conditions specified in 
agreemen tfj,
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Exhibit 1
PRICE COMPETITIVENESS 
OF SUMERBANK
ASM PRIVATE SECTOR
RETAIL PRICE
(for same quality goods)
100 125
GROSS PROFIT 14 44 (35 %)
WHOLESALER PRICE 81
WHOLESALER MARGIN - 8 (10 %)
PRICE PAID TO MANUFACTURER 86 73
Ref: BCG Analysis on Sumerbank
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EXHIBIT .2
RETURN ON INVESTMENTS OF RETAIL STORES
COST of 
goods sold
GROSS 
MARGIN 
RENT EXP. PERS. EXP. 
FIN .EXP. 
OTHERS
TOTAL
EXPENSE
NET
INCOME 
BEFORE TAX
SUHERBANK 
.00 
86
14 
0.5
5
I. 5
J. . 5
8.5
PRIVATE SECTOR 
100 
65
35
6
8
2.5
6.5
23
12
ASSETS
ROI 10 %
17
70 %
ROI= NET INCOME BEFORE TAXES / ASSETS
Ref: BEG Anaiysie on Sumerbank
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EXHIBIT 3
INVENTÜFİY TIIRMOVER RATIOS
REGION I . T . 0 . R
ADANA
ANKARA
BURSA
DİYARBAKIR
ERZURUM
ESKİ SEN IP
GAZİANTEP
İSPARTA
ISTANBUL
IZMIR
KOCAELİ
KONYA
KAYSERI
nazilli
SAMSUN
SİVAS
TRABZON
VAN
ZONGULDAK
3.3
5.4 
2.8
2 . H
O
I.. I.
2 . !■:)
3.3 
I-. :i3.7
3 , 1
3.3
3.7
3.3
2.3
2.5
2.8 
.1 . 4
3.4
AVERAGE
ENGLAND
IN
8
AVERAGE
USA
IN
6
Ref: BCG Analysis on Suinerbank
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ADDITIONAL. COST VS MCHINE AGE 
OF FACTORIES
1984
additional cost
CO
HMw
Ref: 
BCG Analysis on Sumerbank
